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In The Supreme Court
of The State of Utah
MARIE CHILD HAMILTON,
Respondent and Plaintiff,
CASE NO.

Vs.

12543

GORDON DEAN HAMILTON,
Appellant and Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by Marie Child Hamilton for a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of
matrimony with Gordon Dean Hamilton and praying for the care, custody and control of the children
of the marriage, support and maintenance for the
children and alimony for herself, and an award of
an equitable portion of the property that has been
acquired by the plaintiff and defendant during the
course of the marriage.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
; A Decree of Divorce was entered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant and an award
made to the'plaintiff of the care, custody and control
of the children together with an award of alimony,
child support, property, and a $27,000 judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an order remanding the case to
the trial court for a new trial on the portion of the
Decree of Divorce having to do with payments to
the plaintiff for alimony and support, along with
those matters relating to the property settlement
or in the alternative, remand the case to the trial
court with directions to modify the Decree of Divorce
in accordance with defendant's motion to amend
the Decree of Divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was initiated by complaint (R-4) and
the matter came on for hearing on an order to show
'Cause before the Court on September 11, 1970, whereupon the Court ordered defendant to pay $550.00
per month, temporary support, to plaintiff.
-Trial was held without a jury, on the 10th day
- of March, 1971. Plaintiff was awarded a decree of
2

divorce, the custody of the four minor children of
the parties, and the following property.
1. The home of the parties valued at $22,000.00,
subject to a mortgage of $7,036.50 which plaintif:f
was to assume and discharge.
'

2. All of the household furniture, fixtures and
equipment, with an estimated value of $5,000.00.

J

3. A 1969 Pontiac Firebird automobile valued at
$2,370.00.

I

4. The sum of $100.00 per month per child for
four minor children, as child support, for a total
of $400.00 per month.
5. The sum of $250.00 per month alimony.
6. Judgment against defendant for the sum of
$27,000.00, together with legal interest, said judgment to be a lien upon the defendant's partnership
interest in Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors, with the provision that no execution or charging order (sic) against the defendant's partnership
interest for 54 months. (R-56, 57)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF PROPERTY, SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
3

ARGUMENT
The purpose of a property settlement is to equitably divide the property of the parties so that each
can continue to live in a manner befitting their stations in life. The Utah case of Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 U 504, 228 P.2d 681, 34 ALR. 2d 305, states:
"Under the modern view, upon granting a
divorce, a court should in doing equity take
into consideration all of the circumstances
and withhold or decree alimony and distribute the property in accordance with those
circumstances."
The court has previously set forth guidelines for
the division of property in the cases of Foreman V.
Foreman, 111 U 72, 176 P. 2d 144; Pinion v. Pinion,
92 U 255, 67 P. 2d 265, and Woolley v. 'Voolley, 113
U 391, 195 P. 2d 743.
In the instant case the court has imposed upon
defendant a burden which is punitive and impossible
to perform. The court apparently reached its conclusion regarding property settlement by taking
the estimated dollar values of all the property of
the parties including the dollar value of the stated
capital account of the defendant in the partnership
4

of Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors,
dividing by three. From this amount, the court deducted the dollar values of the home, the furniture,
and fixtures therein and the Pontiac Firebird automobile. The balance between the one third and the
personal items, was $27,000.00 which sum the court
awarded as a judgment against defendant's partnership interest. The defendant received only the clothes
on his back and the privilege of driving partnership
vehicles and flying the partnership airplane.
In addition to an award of one third of the property, the court awarded plaintiff support and alimony in the sum of $650.00 per month.
In examining the court's award, we should first
look at the pattern of life of the parties, and then
look at the economic needs of the parties. After establishing the status of the parties, we will examine the award of the court in light of the affidavits relative to defendant's financial interests.
The court apparently overlooked the fact that
the parties had been long estranged ( R-5, 11), separations had been common (R-11) between them and
they had lived separately for over two years just
prior to this action, (R-S, 6). Their way of life and
pattern of living had been fixed by the economic
facts applicable to them.
5

The plaintiff had been required to seek employment because the defendant's earnings were inadequate to provide all of her needs. The defendant
had not been able to live affluently, but had been
relegated to a frugal existence (R-14, 26).
The plaintiff testified and the court found that
she would require reasonable monthly needs for
household expenditures for herself and the children
of $806.39 and that she would further require the
sum of $278.00 per month to discharge and pay certain debts and obligations (R-36). Thus in considering the plaintiffs needs the court found that she
would require approximately $1,000.00 per month
and that she made $312.00 per month as a nu:;_·s2. The
defendant testified that he received from his partnership interest. the sum of $1,000.00. (R-20, 21) He
testified that he required $390.00 per month for living
expenses and had payments of $50.00 per month for
certain obligations (Tr 26 and R-20, 21). Thus,
plaintiff required $440.00 per month for hjmself.
It is clear in mathematical terms that the court,
in its award of support and alimony, has created a
situation in which defendant will show a deficit
each month. For example, putting the testimony of
the witnesses together, it would appear as follows:
6

Courts Award of Support
and Alimony
Defendants Ability to Pay
Support & Alimony
Deficit to Defendant

$ 650 per mo.
560 per mo.
$

90 per mo.

Defendant cannot make the support and alimony
payments based upon his present income level and
personal expenditures.
In addition to the award of support and alimony,
the court awarded plaintiff one-third of the total
assets of the parties to include the house worth
$22,000.00 less the mortgage, the furniture and fixtures worth $5,000.00, and the 1969 Pontiac Firebird
automobile worth $2,370.00.
In considering the matter from a practical standpoint, the plaintiff received all of the real and personal assets that are meaningful to the general welfare and happiness of people. The defendant does
not object to the award of the home and automobile,
but he has petitioned the court to reduce the alimony
and support to $550.00 per month, which is an
amount the defendant can pay per month. The
defendant further moved to have the $27,000.00
judgment eliminated.
Had the court made a ruling involving support
7

and alimony payments and awarded plaintiff all
other property of the parties exclusive of the partnership interest in Hamilton Brothers Electrical
Contractors, the defendant would have had a fighting chance for survival, however, the court's judgment leaves him no alternative.
It is submitted that the court went far beyond
what is reasonable and awarded judgment against
defendant in the amout of $27,000.00, and made said
judgment a lien against defendants partnership
interest. This is analogous to giving the plaintiff
the milk from the cow and requiring that the cow
be killed to provide meat for her too. When the cow
dies there is no more milk and both the cow and the
milk are gone.
The judgment against defendant must be paid
off in 54 months. Obviously, the only source of income remaining to the defendant is the undivided
50°/o interest the defendant has in the partnership
consisting of welders, wrenches, tools, and the general assets of an Electrical Contracting business.
In this instance the court only considered dollar
totals being unmindful of the fact that tools are
merely the means to the rewards of energy and ambition but do not of themselves provide comfort,
pleasure or solace when day is done. This defendant,
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for all his assets (see financial statements R-44),
returns to a single room in a motel whose furnishings
are owned by another. He has not even the privilege
of selection in respect to the material comforts of
life-except to choose the furnished room he'll live
Ill (R-26).
A critical determination of the court was based
on a financial sheet, which according to the attached affidavits, do not reflect the true value of defendants partnership assets. The court denied defendants motion to establish his true financial
status based on evidence unavailable at time of trial,
which in and of itself would seem to be ground for
a rehearing in the matter.
A factor the court seemed not to appreciate, not
withstanding unrefuted testimony to this effect, and
not withstanding knowledge common to all lawyers
with some business experience, is that the assets
of the defendant were substantially overstated in
order to provide a financial base for acquiring bonding capacity for bidding of various projects by the
business (R-27). Especially indicative of this situation is the carried book value of the airplane of
$56,935 (R-44) as compared to its true value of
$39,000 or $36,000 as estimated in the affidavits of
Jensen and Battochio (R-47, 55) respectively.
9

If the financial statements were amended to reflect just the fair market value of the airplane, the
net worth of the defendant would have to be reduced
by approximately $10,000.
Shortly after the trial, the accountants were
able to close the books of the partnership and determine the partnership's yearly statement. This information was not available at the time of trial (R-24).
The court will remember that at the trial, defendant
was only able to furnish the court with an eleven
month statement with estimated calculations (R-24).
Upon closing the partnership, the capital account of
defendant was $86,299.42 which was considerably
less than the $109,000 reflected on the eleven month
estimate used by the court (R-44). The adjusted figures are reduced even further by taking the affidavit of LeRay L. McAllister C.P.A., and reducing
carried book value of the plane by using the year
end balance sheet. This shows that the defendant's
partnership interest was really $80,331.89 (R-54)
instead of $109,000. Even this latter figure is inflated
by carrying assets at higher than real value for
bonding purposes. (R-27) Had the court used its
method of awarding one-third of the property to
plaintiff and based those calculations on the year
end balance sheet, the judgment of $27,000 would
10

have been reduced to approximately $12,500.
If the court had used the statement of Blair
Hamilton that he would pay $55,000 for defendants
interest, the court, using its same method would
have reduced the judgment to approximately $4,000.
Defendant, in his motion, states that he had not
anticipated an award of judgment as outlined above
and for that reason was not prepared to give testimony as to the effect such a judgment would have
on defendant's business. Because of the extreme
hardship and impossibility of performance, as set
forth in defendant's affidavit (R-50, 51), this matter should be remanded to the trial court to make
an equitable property settlement.
Thus the court has placed defendant on
the horns of an impossible dilemma. It
has first saddled him with an obligation
for support an alimony in excess of what he makes
and has further burdened defendant with a judgment of $27,000.00, which judgment must be paid off
in 54 months or execution of the partnership interest will be ordered. The only way defendant can pay
off the $27,000.00 judgment is out of the income from
the business, which as explained above, is already
expended each month, or to liquidate his assets in
the partnership, which would certainly have an ad11

verse effect on the business and would impair the
capital and earning capacity of defendant. Mr.
Gardner, Senior Vice President of Zions First
National Bank, and the banker that handles the
business of Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors, and that of the defendant, and who is intimately acquainted with his assets states in
his af;fidavit (R-42, 43) that there is no
possibility of defendant borrowing $27,000.00, and
that his partnership interest would not be sufficient
as collateral. In truth, the defendant has no place
to turn for relief from this impossible situation,
other than this court.
Again in mathematical terms, a monthly payoff
of $27,000.00 amortized over a 54 month period at
judgment interest, is $602.25 per month, which defendant has no way to raise without liquidating the
assets of his business, which would obviously have
the effect of reducing the income he is able to obtain
from that business. The interest on that sum alone,
not accumulated, is $180.00 per month. Defendar.t's
business is a risky one, as shown by the variation in
his income. In 1970 defendant's income from the business before taxes was $9,954 (R-50) and in 1967 it
was $6,610.94 before taxes (Ex-5).
The economic realities of the court's award are
12

that plaintiff will receive the following amounts
from defendant:
1. Support and alimony of $650.00 per month.
2. $500.00 per month repayment of principal for
54 months, which will total $27,000.00. ($500 X 54
- $27,000)
3. Interest amortized of 54 months of $102.25 per
month.
In the event the Plaintiff could pay the judgment
amount by the month, he would be required to pay
to plaintiff $1,252.25 ($650 support and alimony,
$602.25 amortized judgment) each month.
In addition to $1252.25 from the defendant, the
plaintiff earns $312.00 per month so that by the
court's award, she will have income of $1,564.25 per
month for the next 54 months or $18,771.00 per year.
Since this is an impossible burden for defendant
it is more likely that defendant will not be able to
pay the $27,000.00 judgment so that the interest of
the judgment will accumulate each month at the
rate of $180.00 or $9,720.00 for the 54 months. Thus,
at the end of 54 months, defendant will owe plaintiff
$36,720 on the judgment plus he will have paid plaintiff $35,100 support and alimony for the 54 month
13

period.
The assets rema1n1ng to defendant do not earn
interest, but merely provide income only based on
the defendant's ability to put the assets to work,
consequently, his assets in and of themselves, are
unproductive except to provide the basis for employment. Furthermore, the assets are of a quickly
depreciating variety, and unless replaced, will leave
him with little or no net worth at the expiration of
54 months.
It is submitted that the court has violated the
general rule of property settlements laid down many
years ago in the case of Griffin v. Griffin, 18 U 98,
55 P. 87, wherein the court stated that as a general
rule the wife in a divorce action is entitled to onethird of either the property of the husband or income of the husband. The court quoted 2 Bishop on
Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Section 1029, as
follows:
"The dissolution of a marriage by divorce
is analogous to its dissolution by death.
A judicial separation from bed and board is
partly so. In a sort of general way with
variations after which it is not needful here
to inquire, the common law gives the widow
on the death of the husband one-third of his
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estate. So that, looking at this sort of analogy, if one-third of the husband's income
will leave the wife on divorce as well off
pecuniarily as though the cohabitation continued, with something in compensation for
her injury, such, when not reduced by a
separate income of her own, may well be regarded as a sort of common, matter-of-course
proportion."
Since the husband does go on living, the courts
usually charge the husband's income with the burden of support and alimony. This is consistent with
the one-third ru!e in that the wife may take onethird of the income or one-third of that which generates the income, which in theory should generate
the same income for her. In any event, the court in
this case violated the rule of the Griffin case and
awarded what amounts to a double payment of defendant's property in that plaintiff first is awarded two-thirds of defendant's income and second, she
gets one-third of the property (which as stated before, should be adjusted) which is producing that
income and which is essential to pay the first obligation. In the above situation, the plaintiff gets
both the income and the one-third property settlement. A one-third property settlement would have
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resulted in monthly payments which would approximate the support and alimony award. The unfairness of this situation violates the very broad rule
set forth in 24 Am. Jur, 2d 748, wherein it states:
"It is clear that the amount of alimony
allowed should not be such as would probably take all of defendant's property, so
such as he cannot pay, or such as will impair
his earning capacity."
Cases are cited in 1 ALR. 3d 38 and flollowing
which support the above rule. Among them is R ussell v. Russell, 78 App. DC 44, 142 F.2d 753, 53 ALR
1037, which states:
"The award of alimony should not be made
so high as to cause financial embarrassment
on the part of the husband, which may impair his earning capacity, for even a husband
with a comparatively large income who has
wronged his former wife, must live up to
the standards required by his job and enjoy
reasonable peace of mind. Otherwise, he
will not likely continue to earn that income
and the wife herself will be the prjncipal
sufferer."
The above rules aptly fit the instant case. Al-
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though defendant recognizes that the court has a
great deal of discretion in making property settlements in divorce matters, there are a number of
cases which limit the discretion of the court. In Anderson v. Anderson, 104 U 104, 138 P. 2d 252, the
court stated :
"This court has said that the granting of
alimony, and distribution of property in a
divorce action, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and on appeal review will be made of the action, but the decree modified only when there is an abuse
of that discretion and the award is not
legally sound." (citing cases.) (emphasis
added)
The case of Pinney v. Pinney, 66 U 612, 245 P. 329,
states approximately the same rule, stating that:
"Unless it appears from the Findings that
the division made is not equitable under all
circumstances of the case, an appellate court
should not and will not disturb the order
of the trial court." (emphasis added)
It is submitted that the above award is not legally
sound, that it is unequitable and impossible of performance. It is submitted further, that upon a re-
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view of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as contained in the above case, that the conclusion is inescapable that defendant cannot perform
in accordance with the dictates of the court. The
award of property is not meant to be a punitive
measure and certainly the testimony given by the
plaintiff would only indicate domestic incompatibility as a basis for divorce, the grounds not being contested by the defendant. The court has failed to take
into consideration all of the circumstances of the
parties, inasmuch as its award of support and maintenance, coupled with the earnings of the plaintiff
and the personal expenses of defendant, will leave
defendant with a deficit balance each month.
The court has awarded to plaintiff all of the
marital properties worth a considerable sum, which
will further secure plaintiff's position. There is no
rule of law which provides for an award of a partnership property, which is the effect of the judgment in the above case, except in those situations
where the husband and wife are actual partners in
the business. The court need not be concerned with
the capital and assets which plaintiff has in the
business, inasmuch as that capital is only worth what
it can generate in income, which in this case, the
court has charged with the additional burden of
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$650.00 per month, plus interest at 8o/o on one-third
of it. It was unreasonable and unfair of the court
not to take further testimony in the matter based
upon the affidavits attached to defendant's motion
for a new trial. Those affidavits point out the seriousness of the $27,000.00 judgment as it affects
defendant's busines and if the judgment is allowed
to stand will have the probable effect of destroying
defendant's capacity for earning income in the
amount he now makes.
CONCLUSION

In view of the testimony in the case, it is clear
that the court has imposed upon the defendant an
impossible burden which he cannot presently meet.
His income from the business will be expended each
month for the support and alimony payments and
his personal needs. There is no way at the present
time, based upon the affidavits of Wallace Gardner,
his brother and partner Blair Hamilton, and defendant that he can pay the $27,000.00 judgment.
Because this is an equitable matter, this court should
review the record in the matter and either modify
the decree or remand the matter back to the trial
court for further hearing. It is submitted that a
judgment in excess of defendant's ability to pay and
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which deprives him of all his personal assets is in
all aspects unfair, unreasonable, and a penalty to
defendant and said judgment should be vacated or
modified.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON HOWARD, for:
HOW ARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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